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1963] RECENT DECISIONS II65 
CIVIL PROCEDURE-TRIAL PRACTICE-SPECIAL VERDICT QUESTION THAT 
CAN BE DECISIVE ONLY IF ANSWERED NEGATIVELY-Plaintiff was severely 
burned by the explosion of a can of "liquid bug killer" allegedly sold to 
him by defendant. Four issues of fact were raised: whether defendant 
sold the can in question to plaintiff, the former's negligence, the latter's 
contributory negligence, and the amount of the damages. The trial judge 
submitted to the jury, over the objections of both parties, only the first 
issue, in the form of a single question of fact. The jury, having served 
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three days past the end of its term and one hour past the normal time 
for adjournment, was instructed that a finding for defendant on the 
single question submitted would exonerate defendant, while a finding 
for plaintiff would necessitate submission of further issues. The jury 
found for defendant on the issue submitted, and the trial judge en-
tered judgment accordingly. The state intermediate appellate court af-
firmed. On certiorari to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, held, reversed, 
one judge dissenting. The right of trial by jury, as preserved by the 
Tennessee constitution, requires that the jury be informed as to its option 
to return a general verdict for either party, that the jury not be informed 
of the legal effect of its answers to special verdict questions, and that all 
issues raised by the pleadings be submitted to the jury. Harbison v. Briggs 
Bros. Paint Mfg. Co., 209 Tenn. 534, 354 S.W.2d 464 (1962). 
The special verdict originated in England with the Statute of West-
minster II,1 which, by granting the jury the right to render only a finding 
of facts, permitted it to re!use to return a general verdict. This reduced 
the ominous threat of an attaint2 for a false verdict by leaving to the judge 
the duty of applying the law and rendering judgment.3 The writ of 
attaint was abolished in 1825,4 but by that time the option to render either 
a special or a general verdict was a well-established prerogative of the 
common-law trial jury.5 Although the special verdict was a part of the 
common-law heritage of the 'states, most states codified the common law 
through enactment of special verdict statutes which often provided, in 
addition, for the submission of special interrogatories or questions of 
fact to be answered along with a general verdict. 
The common-law special verdict, as developed in England prior to 
1776 and subsequently modified by North Carolina prior to 1796, became 
a part of the common law of Tennessee6 and, in question and answer 
form, has been used there several times.7 Although there is some evidence 
of common-law precedent for the use of the special interrogatory in Ten-
1 13 Edw. 1, c. 30, § 2(4) (1285). 
2 The attaint was used for several centuries as the sole remedy for a false verdict. 
A second and larger jury passed on the verdict of the first jury and, if the former 
found differently, the first jury was severely punished. See generally THAYER, A PRELIMI· 
NARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 140 (1898). 
3 See generally 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 403 (Wendell ed. 1854); 1 HOLDSWORTH, 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 337 (7th ed. 1956); Morgan, A Brief History of Special Verdicts 
and Special Interrogatories, 32 YALE L.J. 575 (1923). 
4 6 Geo. IV, c. 50, § 60 (1825). 
5 The jury could render a "narrative special verdict" by merely listing the facts, 
or a "question and answer special verdict" by responding to questions on the facts sub-
mitted by the court. These are to be distinguished from special interrogatories, which 
are fact questions put to the jury to be answered with or after a general verdict. See 
Morgan, supra note 3, at 575, 589-91. 
6 Life 8: Cas. Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 6 Tenn. App. 43, 54 (1927); cf. Gamer v. State, 
13 Tenn. 132, 146-47 (1833). 
7 E.g., Life 8: Cas. Ins. Co. v. Robertson, supra note 6, at 51; Clark v. Keith, 76 
Tenn. 703, 706-08 (1882); Burdett v. Norwood, 83 Tenn. 491, 495 (1885) (dictum); cf. 
Comment, 22 TENN. L. REv. 1039 (1953). 
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nessee, this has rarely been employed.8 The principal case correctly con-
strued Tennessee's sole legislative provision in this area9 as providing only 
for special interrogatories, and not for special verdicts.10 
Because the question submitted to the jury in the principal case did 
not accompany instructions for a general verdict, it cannot be deemed a spe-
cial interrogatory. Yet, since it encompassed only one of several issues in dis-
pute, it was not in the strict sense a common-law special verdict instruction, 
which would require a finding on all material facts in issue. The Ten-
nessee Supreme Court found that this modification of a special verdict 
instruction was erroneous in three respects and thereby denied the right 
of trial by jury.11 The first error, the failure to inform the jury of its 
common-law option to return a general verdict, is not regarded, in most 
jurisdictions, as denying a state constitutional right to a jury trial, con-
trary to the conclusion in the principal case. Although in the absence of 
statute it is considered error to fail to inform the jury of its option,12 
juries have been denied this privilege, in whole or in part, in nearly every 
jurisdiction which has enacted a special verdict statute.13 These statutes, 
universally upheld,14 establish that neither the jury nor the litigants have 
a constitutional right to the common-law option. The second error, the 
trial judge's instruction to the jury as to the legal effect of its answer, 
would probably not have been held to deny the right to trial by jury in 
most jurisdictions.115 Most jurisdictions, however, do consider it error to 
8 The commentators differ on whether cases discussing "special issues" or "special 
findings" refer to the special verdict or the special interrogatory. Wicker, Trials and 
New Trials Under the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN. L. REv. 570, 575 &: n.11 (1939); 
Comment, supra note 7, at 1040. But see HIGGINS &: CROWNOVER, TENNESSEE PROCEDURE 
IN I.Aw CASES §§ 1515d-n (1937). 
o "Special Verdicts.-The trial judge ..• may direct and supervise the formulation 
of special issue or issues of fact for submission to and answer by the jury. The response 
or responses of the jury shall have the force of other verdicts at law." TENN. CoDE ANN. 
§ 20-1316 (1955). 
10 There are differing opinions as to whether this statute authorizes special verdicts, 
special interrogatories, or both. See, e.g., Braden, Suggested Changes in Jury Trials, 17 
TENN. L. REv. 206, 208 (1942); Simmonds, Reform in the Jury System, 21 TENN. L. REv. 
389, 393 (1950); Symposium-The Movement for the Simplification of Legal Procedure, 
15 TENN. L. REv. 511, 620 (1939). See also materials in note 8 supra. State statutes have 
differed in terminology, as illustrated by the collection in CLEMENTSON, A MANUAL 
RELATING TO SPECIAL VERDICTS AND SPECIAL FINDINGS BY JURIES 297-320 (1905). 
11 Tennessee's harmless error statute is not applicable where constitutional rights 
are involved. Dykes v. State, 201 Tenn. 65, 68-69, 296 S.W .2d 861, 863 (1956). 
12 E.g., Florida R.R. v. Lassiter, 58 Fla. 234, 50 So. 428 (1909); Fuller v. Insurance 
Co., 31 Me. 325 (1850); Baltimore &: O.R.R. v. School Dist., 3 Pennypacker 518 (Pa. 
1882); Life &: Cas. Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 6 Tenn. App. 43, 53 (1927); Louisville &: N.R.R. 
v. Frakes, 11 Tenn. App. 593, 621 (1928). Cf. Haase v. Morton, 138 Iowa 205, 115 N.W. 
921 (1908) (a single "special interrogatory" on the crucial issue not permitted). 
13 CLEMENTSON, op. cit. supra note 10, at 2-15, 175-85; Alton, Special Verdicts in the 
State Courts, 27 INS. COUNSEL J. 390, 391-92 (1960). 
14 E.g., Udell v. Citizens' St. Ry., 152 Ind. 507, 515,. 52 N.E. 799, 803 (1899); Life 
&: Cas. Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 6 Tenn. App. 43, 52 (1927) (dictum). See generally Donley, 
Trial by Jury in Civil Cases-A Proposed Reform, 34 W. VA. L.Q. 347 (1928); Sunder-
land, Verdicts, General and Special, 28 YALE L.J. 253, 258 (1920). 
115 So far as can be determined, the question of a possible denial of trial by jury 
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inform the jury, expressly or impliedly, of the legal effects of its answers to 
special verdict questions.16 Although to so inform the jury would frustrate 
the fundamental philosophy of the special verdict,17 there is no denial of 
jury trial, for the jury would still have much less control over the final 
judgment than it does in rendering a general verdict, in which the jury 
not only knows the legal effect of its factual findings but also applies the 
law to these findings. The third finding of error was based on Tennessee's 
strict construction of the common-law rule that the jury must find every 
material fact at issue.18 This rule, when strictly construed, has been the 
principal obstacle to the use of the special verdict, as developed at com-
mon law and under some statutes. Some courts have gone so far as to 
hold that trial by jury is denied whenever any material facts, even if not 
disputed or conceded at the trial, were not recited by the jury in its special 
verdict.19 Others have stated flatly that a special verdict is defective unless it 
finds all facts put in issue by the pleadings.20 Previous decisions based 
on a similar inflexible construction of this rule explain in part the in-
frequent usage of the special verdict in Tennessee, as well as the absence 
of special verdict legislation.21 
The Anglo-American institution of trial by jury is the product of a 
steady and constant development from the Conquest to the present day.22 
While the federal government and most states have guaranteed the right 
to trial by jury through broad constitutional provisions,23 only those 
resulting from the court's informing the jury of the legal effect of its answers to 
special verdict questions has rarely, if ever, been considered at the appellate level. Cf. 
note 16 infra. 
16 E.g., Thompson v. Robbins, 157 Tex. 463, 304 S.W.2d lll (1957); Gerrard v. 
La Crosse City Ry., ll3 Wis. 258, 89 N.W. 125 (1902); Ward v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R.R., 
102 Wis. 215, 78 N.W. 442 (1899) (special verdict submitted with general verdict); cf. 
Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Roach, 25 F. Supp. 852 (D. Md. 1939) (not error where 
ordinary man would know legal result); Grieger v. Vega, 153 Tex. 498, 271 S."W.2d 85 
(1954) (not error where obvious to juror of ordinary intelligence). See generally CLEM-
ENTSON, op. cit. supra note 10, at 250-59; "Wicker, Special Interrogatories to Juries in 
Civil Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 296-303 (1926); 43 MINN. L. REv. 823 (1959). 
17 See note 29 infra. 
18 The principal case relied on Memphis St. Ry. v. Newman, 108 Tenn. 666, 669, 
69 s.w. 269 (1902). 
19 E.g., Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408 (1882); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Com-
mercial Nat'l Bank, 55 F.2d 564, 567 (5th Cir. 1932); Standard Sewing Mach. Co. v. Royal 
Ins. Co., 201 Pa. 645, 51 Atl. 354 (1902). Contra, Life & Cas. Co. v. Robertson, 6 Tenn. App. 
43, 55 (1927). See generally CLEMENTSON, op. cit. supra note 10, at 204. 
20 E.g., Housworth v. Bloomhuff, 54 Ind. 487, 497 (1876); Cole v. Crawford, 69 Te.x. 
124, 126, 5 S.W. 646, 647 (1887); Hart v. West Side R.R., 86 Wis. 483, 489, 57 N.W. 91, 
92 (1893). See generally CLEMENTSON, op. cit. supra note 10, at 204. 
21 See generally Green, A New Development in Jury Trial, 13 A.B.A.J. 715, 716 
(1927). 
22 See generally HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 312; MANSCHIZISKER, TRIAL 
BY JURY (1922); THAYER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 130. 
23 U.S. CoNST. amend. VII. State constitutions usually contain a general provision 
that "the right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate" or that "the right to trial by 
jury, as heretofore enjoyed, shall remain inviolate." E.g., TENN. CONST. art. I, § 6. See 
a collection of the various constitutional provisions in 2 THOMPSON, TRIALS § 2226 (2d 
ed. 1912). 
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incidents which are regarded as fundamental and inherent in the jury 
trial system must remain inviolate and beyond reform. Courts and legis-
latures have thus devised numerous checks on the jury to make the system 
more effective; among them are the demurrer, special case and reserved 
point, directed verdict, compulsory nonsuit, and judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict. These improvements have been held constitutional as not 
impairing the fundamentals of trial by jury.24 
It is doubtful that the requirement that all facts put in issue be 
recited by the special verdict can be justified as protecting the right to 
trial by jury. It is basic to the right to jury trial that the judge not 
decide any material fact. However, a judge does not decide a fact if it 
is immaterial to, and can have no effect upon, the eventual judgment. 
This conclusion is supported by decisions in many states holding that the 
failure of the jury to answer questions of fact made immaterial by the 
facts previously found does not deny the right to trial by jury.25 Several 
jurisdictions have held that the failure of the jury to respond to material 
questions is to be regarded merely as a failure of one of the litigants to 
sustain the burden of proof.26 These decisions, however, are distinguish-
able from those in which the judge has failed to submit special verdict 
questions covering all the facts in issue. 
The federal government and several states have eliminated the con-
troversy that often arose concerning the number and form of questions 
submitted by providing that absence of timely objection is to be construed 
as a waiver of trial by jury as to any issue not submitted.27 However, 
in the absence of waiver provisions, the enigma of whether the failure to 
submit questions covering all the material facts denies trial by jury still 
resolves itself into the problem of whether the jury has found all the 
material facts. Therefore, the decisions upholding special verdicts where 
the jury had not answered questions of fact that were in issue but 
not material to the actual decision28 must imply that facts that in no way 
affect the judgment need not be found by the jury, whether submitted 
to them or not. In many jurisdictions, then, there is no constitutional 
24 See generally Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARv. 
L. REv. 669, 671 (1918). Cf. Walker v. Southern Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897). 
26 E.g., White v. Bailey, 14 Conn. 270, 276 (1841); Bower v. Bower, 146 Ind. 393, 
45 N.E. 495 (1896); Oregon Home Builders v. Montgomery Inv. Co., 94 Ore. 349, 184 
Pac. 487 (1919) (dictum); cf. Hager v. Hager, 17 Tenn. App. 143, 66 S.W.2d 250 (1933). 
26 CLEMENTSON, op. cit. supra note IO, at 91-108. 
27 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a); WIS. STAT. § 270.28 (1957). 
28 See note 25 supra; cf. Fox v. Masons' Fraternal Acc. Ass'n, 96 Wis. 390, 71 N."W. 363 
(1897); Chopcn v. Paper Co., 83 Wis. 192, 199, 53 N.W. 452, 454 (1892). In Hosie v. Chicago 
&: N.W.R.R., 282 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1960), the Northern District of Illinois Civil Rule 21, 
which provides for separate trials of liability and damages, was upheld. See generally 
Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Negligence Trials: An Example of the Questionable 
Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. REv. 831 (1961); 74 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1961); 
49 ILL. B.J. 424 (1961); 46 IowA L. REv. 815 (1961). This procedure is to be distinguished 
from that of the principal case where there was a full trial on all issues but only 
submission of one of the issues pertaining to liability. 
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restriction that would prohibit liberalizing the common-law rule requiring 
all material facts raised by the pleadings and evidence to be recited in 
the special verdict. 
The constitutionality of a modification of the special verdict instruction 
resulting in the submission of special verdict questions that can produce 
a judgment only if decided one way necessarily hinges on each jurisdiction's 
interpretation of the rule requiring that all material £acts in issue be found 
by the jury. It is probable that in many jurisdictions the questions sub-
mitted will be deemed sufficient if they result in a finding of all the facts 
material to the judgment rendered, even though other facts might have 
been material had the judgment favored the other party. Even if con-
stitutionally valid, a special verdict practice involving the submission of 
less than all the material facts necessary for a judgment £or either party 
would be of questionable value. One of the advantages of a special verdict 
is that an error in the application of the law by the trial court can be 
corrected on appeal without a complete new trial. This advantage is 
severely compromised where the judge is allowed, in applying the law 
in a given case, to select only those factual questions for submission to 
the jury that are material to a judgment favoring one of the litigants. The 
submission of less than all the material facts in issue would tend to defeat 
another advantage of the special verdict, due to the increased opportunity 
for the prejudice and sentiment of the jury to influence its findings of 
fact. The effect of the jury's prejudices would inevitably be increased by 
informing it that the reduced number of questions can only be decisive 
in favor of one party. Even in the absence of deliberate prejudice, the 
jury's impartiality would be affected by its awareness that certain answers 
would necessitate a second set of questions and instructions.29 In addi-
tion, the time spent in preparation of special verdict questions could not 
be reduced, for all questions normally required for a complete special 
verdict would have to be prepared in advance to prevent delay in the 
event the jury's answer necessitated the submission of further issues. From 
the broader viewpoint of improved trial procedure, the effort devoted to 
this procedural reform might better be spent perfecting the conventional 
special verdict procedure applicable to all civil litigation. In a carefully 
planned special verdict practice the questions need not be numerous or 
confusing to the jury.30 The sole advantage gained from this modified 
29 On the merits of restricting the jury to consideration of the facts, see Skidmore 
v. Baltimore &: O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1948). Others disagree, advancing the theory 
that the function of the jury is to mitigate the harshness of inflexible rules of law 
with common sense, applying justice according to the standards of the community. 
Spar£ &: Hanson v. United States, 156 U.S. 151 (1894) (dissenting opinion). See generally 
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 129-32 (1949); Sunderland, supra note 14; 43 MINN. L. REv. 
823 (1959); cf. Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 
OHIO ST. L.J. 158 (1958). 
30 See generally McCormick, Jury Verdicts Upon Special Questions in Civil Cases, 
in 8 JUDICIAL AoMINISI'RATION MONOGRAPHS 3 (1941); Dooley, The Use of Special Issues 
Under the New State and Federal Rules, 20 TEXAS L. REv. 32 (1941); Green, supra note 
21; Sunderland, supra note 14-, at 263. 
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procedure is that, in those circumstances where it could be applied, it 
might reduce the time spent in jury deliberation. This is too small a 
benefit to justify compromising the advantages realizable through the 
continued use of the conventional special verdict. 
Samuel ]. McKim, III 
